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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



State Department review completed

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| | Libya: The I | Libyan undersecretary of fin | nance has informed | |
| | tial modification of | cial in Bengasi that Libya wi of the American base agree | ment if necessary to | 2 |
| | Base. As an alter | payment for American use rnative to the present aid pr | ogram, he pro- | |
| .10 | which he claims v | t of customs duties on Whee would bring in some \$28,000 is, he said, Libya could the | ,000 per year. If | |
| \mathcal{N} | ask that US forces | s be moved out of the countr how strongly the governmen | y. While it re- | |
| | on the undersecre | etary's proposal, there is st ernment with present Amer | rong dissatisfaction | |
| | ments.] | (Page 3) | | |
| | | III. THE WEST | | |
| | Italy: There | are increasing signs of con | flict, within the | |
| NO | | atic party and between it an | d its allies, which | |
| ı | 8 Jan 60 | DAILY BRIEF | ìi | |
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| | Christian Democ before the end of volved in the cur minute postponer | aure of the Segni government. Trats are predicting that Segni January. President Gronchi Trent political maneuverings, a ment of his trip to Moscow, when to 7 January, may have been | may resign is deeply in- and the last- nich had been | 25) |
| | by his concern o | ver the possibility of a cabinet as publicly announced. | crisis rather | 25) |
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| | 8 Jan 60 | DAILY BRIEF | iii | · |
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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

| Situation | in the | e Caribbean | Through | 1960. | . SNIE 80-1-59 |
|--------------|--------|-------------|---------|-------|----------------|
| 29 Dec 1959. | | | | | |

8 Jan 60

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DAILY BRIEF

iv

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

New Government in Laos

The balanced composition of the provisional government appointed by the King on 7 January should ease the strains between the various non-Communist groups. Khou Abhay, the new premier, is a respected elder statesman whose most recent position was as president of the King's Council. In addition to Khou, three other political independents are in the cabinet, including Khou's brother, Nhouy Abhay, who reportedly selected the cabinet and who will serve as deputy prime minister and minister of education. The remaining six portfolios are split evenly between the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI), which will control the key ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and finance, and former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP) which will control, among other posts, the interior ministry. Minister of Defense General Phoumi, an important CDNI leader, is the only military figure in the cabinet.

The cabinet appears to be a generally capable one and is probably the best that could have been obtained under present political conditions in Laos. Its main function will be to prepare the country for general elections later this year. In the process, there is likely to be considerable jockeying between the CDNI and the RLP, but in view of the CDNI's enhanced power position, it will probably have the predominant voice in choosing the candidates for the anti-Communist slate.

| Many of the may play a moaffairs. | he new cabinet me ere active, if still | mbers are close indirect, role in | to the King, who governmental |
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8 Jan 60

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1

Libyan Pressures For More US Aid With Fewer Controls

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Libyan officials are continuing wheir pressure for more US financial aid and fewer controls on expenditure as the price for American air-base rights in Libya. Libyan Undersecretary of Finance Shaglouf has informed an American official in Bengasi that, as an alternate to the present aid program, he proposes assessment of customs duties on Wheelus Base imports, which he claims would bring in some \$28,000,000 per year--all of it completely under Libyan control. Shaglouf feels that if the United States should refuse to modify the base agreement to permit this, the Libyan Government should then go to the United Nations and ask that US forces be moved out of Libya?

The Libyan-American base agreement, valid until 24 December 1970, was signed in 1954. In November 1958, however, the Libyan Government initiated negotiations for revision of the financial clauses of the agreement, seeking larger US aid funds completely at the disposal of the Libyan Government. Total US aid to Libya was about \$25,000,000 in each of the Libyan fiscal years 1957 and 1958 and will amount to more than \$32,000,000--including emergency drought assistance--in the current fiscal year ending 31 March. The Libyan Government had a completely free hand, however, in the expenditure of only a small part of this aid.7

The prime minister and other leading Libyan officials have registered strong dissatisfaction with American aid proposals for fiscal 1960, which are similar to those of the preceding years. It is not clear how much governmental support Shaglouf has for the change he proposes, but the Libyan Government is almost certain to make new demands in connection with its consideration of the draft budget immediately after the 17 January parliamentary elections.

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8 Jan 60

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 3

III. THE WEST

Threats to Segni Government

Premier Segni's minority Christian Democratic government may soon face a crisis over whether it should seek support from the left or the right and over what stand it should take on controversial legislation. The last-minute postponement of President Gronchi's trip to the USSR, publicly attributed to illness, may have been the result of pressure from right-wing elements who support the government, or from restive left-wing Christian Democrats who desire its fall.

Continued alliance with the right -- Liberals, Monarchists, and neo-Fascists--threatens to damage the showing of the Christian Democratic Party (CD) in the nationwide local elections planned for spring, and leaves the government vulnerable to attack by former Premier Fanfani's Christian Democratic left wing. (Fanfani is reported to have said the government would fall in February; several prominent Christian Democratic senators have predicted its January demise?

The Christian Democratic right wing and the rightist parties supporting Segni fear a CD alliance with the Nenni Socialists. Party Secretary Moro recently proffered a hand to the Nenni Socialists in Sicily and publicly affirmed the anticonservative nature of the CD, thus alarming the government's rightist allies.

Current issues on which either side could bring about a cabinet fall are: a controversial antitrust bill; the nuclear energy act, which some Christian Democrats feel would permit private control of energy development; and the "green plan' for agriculture, which will require \$800,000,000 in financing. An additional source of friction is Segni's proposal to remove the editor of Il Giorno, a newspaper financed by oil tycoon Mattei, who favors the left wing of the Christian Democratic party.

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8 Jan 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 4

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25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Secretary of Commerce

The Department of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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